to help find common ground

In a negotiation you may concede certain issues, either to conserve strength or in the hopes that your opponent will reciprocate. But if you establish that a position is mutually preferred, not just conceded, that will bring parties closer together.

to educate participants

In class, I’m continually criticising civic engagements that just act to educate people without giving them power, but I’ll accept that education about the diversity of viewpoints in a community is a great secondary effect of engagement.

to make the outcome satisfactory

In a negotiation, parties walk away from the table saying “oh well, that’s the best we could do with the cards we had”. That’s going to lead to hard feelings and attempts at reversing the decision down the road. Deliberative democracy should leave people saying “that’s the best of all possible solutions”.

Deliberative democracy is also supposed to be better at incorporating diversity than representative democracy. But what if your participants are so diverse that they use completely different methods of reasoning? Examples:

• scientific evidence versus anecdotal evidence
• oral history versus ownership-by-cartography
• evidence gathered while dreaming or hallucinating

I think the most we can require is that each participant’s system of reasoning be internally consistent: all proclamations of the machine elves are given equal standing. But I’m skeptical of the ability to assess the internal consistency of other peoples’ systems of reasoning. It appears that deliberative democracy requires us all to become social relativists?

You’ve got 14-year-old girls essentially presenting themselves as a brand, trying to create a public persona, polishing an image of themselves that’s all surface: how you look and what you did yesterday, not who you are and what you want to be. And that leads to a sense of disconnection from themselves, because in most cases, these girls don’t even realize that their persona is not who they are. They’re just focused on striving to please their market and presenting the brand they think will sell.

This is coming from a guy who has been doing a speaking tour to promote his new book and who cites his own credentials to support his point! Why would what you want to do tomorrow be a more important part of your identity than what you did yesterday? Especially when the desires of teenagers are mostly externally imposed.

Girls who see themselves as brands will likely go on to be more successful than girls who want to be loved for their authentic selves. And having “anorexia of the soul” is at least as healthy as the chronic existential crisis that strikes the “authentic” people in our society.

Dr. Sax shows his hand by applying premodern morality and seeming hopelessly out of touch with the historical reality of being a woman:

I find it troubling that so many girls are using their sexuality in an instrumental way, in order to accomplish some other end such as raising their social status, but not as an expression of their own [feelings and desires].

At the time, optical theory was not advanced enough to explain how telescopes worked. So Galileo had to trust on faith that his instruments were measuring what he thought they were measuring. It’s not scientific, but Galileo was supported by a consensus of astronomers, including Jesuits.

Observations of planets do not distinguish between the Tychonic system, where the sun orbits the earth and all other planets orbit the sun, and the heliocentric system. The only way to determine if the earth is moving is by stellar parallax: the triangulation of stars from opposite ends of the earth’s orbit. Galileo predicted stellar parallax but it was not observed for 115 years*, so his theory was falsified until then.

In fact, under relativity it is impossible to determine whether the universe has a centre, so it is a theological rather than scientific statement.

The proper way to consider Galileo’s work is not as a scientific result, but a shift to a new paradigm: astronomy based on telescope evidence with no reference to scripture. You might find this more elegant, it might be better at landing people on the moon, but there’s no basis for saying it’s more truthful.

* And even then it wasn’t stellar parallax, it was the unpredicted steller aberration. Parallax wasn’t observed until 228 years after Galileo’s prediction.

This hypothesis can be easily tested in speed dating: do men choose more partners for follow-up than women? Recent research finds that small manipulations to the speed dating ritual result in the opposite outcome predicted by evolutionary psychology. In conclusion, the fundamental behavior of women is socially constructed and the entire field of evolutionary psychology is modernist bullshit.

If left to our own devices, most of the decisions we make are satisficing: choosing to do things that are good enough. You wear whatever’s clean, you watch whatever’s on, you do stuff because your friends are doing it, etc. (If your habitual actions happen to be Stuff White People Like, then you’re automatically authentic.)

But under modernism, this unplanned, unexamined life is supposed to be better than a life that’s engineered, a life of artifice. I beg to differ: people should be allowed to invent their identities, to “fake it till you make it”. The test is how well they pull it off, how consistent is their identity? And, of course, acting a particular way for personal gain is not cool, while acting a particular way because it’s enjoyable is cool.

Let’s call this act of constructing, projecting and maintaining an identity “personal branding“. I think that rather than construct an identity out of thin air, you should look at where you’re successful in life and what aspects you’re happy about. Distil a brand essence out of those. Then build on your strengths and nudge the rest of your life into alignment with your brand.

Introspection is untrustworthy: a lot of crazy philosophy, psychology and religion has come out of very smart people doing introspection. I especially don’t trust introspection for this kind of thing. It will yield a combination of society’s values (the metanarrative), the unrealistic person you’d like to be (superman’s values) and values that other people are pushing on you (mom’s values).

I don’t believe that people have intrinsic, unchanging values, but introspection will not even give insight to your socially-constructed self. Postmodernism says that not only is the self not fixed, but it’s fuzzier and less solid than we think it is. (And we think that our selves are sharp and solid because of introspection.)

Instead, you need to observe yourself to reveal values in your behavior. Rather than identifying the values you’d like to live by, I think it’s better to identify the values you actually are living by. Observing yourself without falling into the trap of introspection is hard: it’s easier to observe other people and get other people to observe you.

Modernist identity theory says that people have fundamental attributes that they carry around with them throughout life. In early-modern theory these attributes were shared by a group, so Brits would act British rather than go native in the colonies. Late-modern theory says that fundamental attributes differ from person to person – they’re what make people unique.

Exactly how we characterize fundamental attributes has gone through a few changes over the years. From mission and principles to values in the most recent shift.

When you see someone do something, you can either say they’re reacting to their situation or acting according to their fundamental attributes. Your theory of mind says that sometimes people do stuff because they have consistent, internal attributes; and sometimes their behavior is dictated by a context-dependent, external situation. Psychologists have noted that, when in doubt, you’ll err on the side of fundamental attributes. You think Alice does X because Alice is the kind of person who does X not because X seemed like the best thing to do from Alice’s point of view.

Postmodernism says that modernist identity theory is just one big fundamental attribution error. People don’t have fundamental attributes. Alice does X because she’s socially constructed that way.

Since graduation, I’ve been trying to fill in those blanks. I don’t feel that I have the interest nor the time build a foundation of orthodox modernism* and modernist critical theory, and then apply the dialectic method to learn postmodernism from that, so I read postmodern stuff without the prerequisites.

I’m particularly interested in postmodern identity theory. It has been said that late modern and postmodern philosophy is all “footnotes to Kant“. It turns out that Kant laid the foundation for what I consider postmodern identity:

Kant says that things have a phenomenal nature, which you can perceive, and a noumenal nature that is unknowable. Your noumenal self is basically your “soul” or core self, but you can only perceive your phenomenal self, which is socially constructed. Morality rests on the rational free will of noumenal selves.

But Nietzsche says that noumenal things are a meaningless fiction: since they have no properties, the world can be entirely explained in terms of phenomenal things. So we are all just bundles of constructed identities and moral relativism is king.

Philosophy is also notoriously hard to read. The defence I usually give is that philosophy is hard to write about because the concepts are not intuitive, otherwise the reader would have already figured it out on their own. Most philosophy is actually written in the style of saying the same relatively-simple idea over and over again in different complicated ways, because philosophers can’t figure out how state it simply.

But unlike science, philosophy studies things that are important to everyone.* So it’s not just unfortunate if everyone can’t read it, it may not be useful to do philosophy if it can’t be widely communicated. I recently found a great statement of this argument in a review of an influential cultural studies book titled The Practice of Everyday Life:

De Certeau’s text claims to address the roles [of] “average people” yet his style creates a virtually impenetrable barrier to any “average people” ever benefiting from his ideas. His writing style consistently maintains this elitist and arrogant attitude in which he postures as the high priest: only those willing to pass the “trial by reading” which he poses are admitted into the sacred circle of his wisdom.

* Even metaphysics: if I need to follow certain rules or face eternal damnation, I’d like to know that sooner rather than later.

I don’t really get neo-Marxism, while I do dig postmodernism, so I see the situation through a postmodern lens: The neo-Marxists are incredulous to the dominant meta-narrative (ie: work is good) but see their own meta-narrative (ie: wacky stuff is good) as more authentic. Postmodernism says that all meta-narratives are not credible and the craving for the authentic is part of the late-modern meta-narrative, so the neo-Marxists are part of the system they’re attempting to overthrow. (The highly accessible text that introduced me to this idea is The Rebel Sell.)